Populist #15

Deficiencies of Our Current Federal System, continued

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The guiding principle in the creation of

our Constitution was that any power not expressly authorized to

the government was strictly forbidden. 

The ninth and tenth amendments, taken together, state clearly

that the Constitution is not meant to be a complete list of the

rights of the People; but does afford a complete list of all powers

expressly entrusted to the federal government.  Today the

federal government itself subjectively decides what the meaning of

the Constitution is.  It holds a monopoly over the

interpretation of the very document that was created to keep it in

check.  Just as Thomas Jefferson once warned, it has, in

actuality, become the sole judge of the limits and extents of its

own powers.  The fact to be stated is that the Constitution has

failed in its original purpose.  The States and the People, in

practice, are rendered defenseless, and now retain only those rights

and powers which the federal government decides to allow them.

In every free government, the people must give their approval to

the laws by which they are governed.  This is truly the

difference between a free government and a despotic one.  The

former are governed by the will of the whole, and the latter ruled

by the will of just one or a few.  If the people are to give

their sanction to the laws by themselves, or through people chosen

and appointed by them, the method of the choice, as well as the

number of representatives they choose, must be done in such a way so

that the representatives possess, and are highly qualified to make

clearly known, the exact opinions of the People.  For, if they

do not know, or are not properly qualified to state the opinions and

desires of the people, the people do not truly govern, and the

sovereignty is thus left in the hands of a few.

It is failures and deficiencies such as these that have led me to

this examination of our government's structure, and the publishing

of my findings in these papers.  In my last few editions, I

have begun the daunting task of analyzing closely, the inherent

defects in the structure of the federal legislature.  It is

this branch, which in every free government is to be the strongest

branch, which can never receive too much attention in our study.

As discussed previously, the Senate, the aristocratic body in our

government, is constructed on the most disparate foundations. 

From this examination of the organization of the federal government,

it appears to me to be self-evident that it is nearly devoid of all

responsibility or accountability to the People, and far from being a

proper half of the legislative branch; it is, in practice, an almost

permanent aristocracy.

The United States Senate, as examined in previous papers, has a

unique combination of legislative, executive, and judicial powers,

which in my opinion, not only clash with each other, but leaves open

too great a possibility of collusion with the other branches to

destroy our liberties.

As a brief review, the Senate is the following:
1. One branch

of the national legislature.  In this respect, it possesses

equal powers in all matters with the House of Representatives; as I

regard the right of the House to originate budgetary bills to be

insignificant, since the Senate is needed to concur.

2. A part or branch of the executive.  In this respect,

their assent is required for the appointment of ambassadors, the

judiciary, and many other public servants, and for the approval of

treaties.

3. Part of the judicial.  In this respect, they form the

court of impeachments.  In theory and in reality, the right of

impeachment in the House has held little importance or effect; due

to party alliances, and other outside motivations, the House does

not often expect to convict the transgressor, and has seldom

exercised this right.

Such various, extensive, and important powers, resting in one

small body of people, is inconsistent will all standing maxims of

freedom.  In order for the People to safely entrust their

rulers with power, their representatives must be chosen by them,

their power must be adequately limited, they must closely resemble

the wants of the People if they were assembled as a whole, and the

People should be well-acquainted with their abilities to govern with

discernment and justice.  The Senate is lacking so greatly in

all these matters that it is dangerous to our freedom and liberty.

We are often told that "we can vote for whomever we please", and

because of this, we will most often elect good people to

government.  But, in examining the structure of our

legislature, and more specifically, the Senate, is it truly possible

for the People to elect capable and suitable representatives when

the number comprising it is so small?

Having the ability to vote for whomever we please is a statement

made without proper attention to the reality and facts of our

situation.  To explain what I mean by this, it is necessary to

consider three groups of people which are most commonly candidates

for the House and Senate:

1. People who make of the natural aristocracy which was defined

in a previous paper.
2. Popular icons.
3. The vast,

respectable part of our society, who are thoughtful, perceptive, and

just; but because they are not in the public eye, they are most

often disregarded.

As our experience has so plainly shown us, when the people of a

district or state are called upon to choose federal representatives,

they most often give a major portion, if not a large majority, of

their votes to some very famous or popular person.  Our

experience has also taught us that the representation in the House,

and even more so in the Senate, is so small compared to the great

population of this nation, that normally very few, if any, of the

third group are ever elected.  A person that is well-known

among a few thousand people is most often completely unknown among

much larger numbers; and therefore, it has been found to be almost

entirely impracticable for those people of the third group to

achieve enough popularity and votes to be entrusted with the public

office.  Because of this, the federal government has not been a

true representation of the People, but rather, it has been more so

that of an aristocracy, or a group of popular demagogues. 

The small numbers in Congress is not the only danger we

experience.  Since we draw our elected officials in Congress

from the same groups of people, its bicameral structure itself, upon

an enlightened examination, becomes pure illusion.  It is

deceptive to tell a people that they are electors, and can choose

whomever they want, if they cannot, in the reality of the system,

choose people from amongst themselves, and genuinely similar to

themselves; truly representing their interests.  Thus, the real

object here is to enlarge the representation in Congress enough so

that a proportional number of the third group will be elected to

office instead of almost entirely the first two.  An

appropriate restructuring and enlargement of Congress has the

potential of rendering one branch, the Senate, obsolete.  A

further examination and complete details of this structure will be

best examined in a future paper.

The mere existence of an elected branch is in no way an assurance

of free government.  In ancient Rome, the people were

despondent, even though they had three branches; consuls, tribunes,

and senators.  Their miserable state was mostly

brought upon them because of an improper and feeble

representation.  What was the consequence of this paltry

representation?  The people of Rome almost always elected for

their representatives, people who were well-known for their military

commands, riches, or other professional popularity; and this did

little to defend them against the machinations of the nobles.

A short summary of the concept that I have attempted to present

here has been that when the legislative branch of government is too

small, the People have no true defense or assurance of liberty, and

they have everything to fear from those who wish to consolidate

power.  If they expect, or even hope to find honest and open

political friends in the rich and powerful, they are fools.  On

the other hand, create an appropriate democratic branch, held to a

high-level of responsibility to the People, and the power of the

aristocrats in government, as well as the executive, will be

limited.  The People will then have very little to fear, and

their liberties will always be secure.

I will continue this examination of the defects of our federal

system in my next paper, on November 17, 2005.  In parting, I

am also reminded of the words of Demosthenes, often considered the

greatest orator of ancient Greece:

"That there is one common bulwark with which people of

prudence are naturally provided, the guard and security of all

people, particularly of Free states, against the assaults of

tyrants.  What is this?  Distrust."

In the spirit of liberty and prosperity,

Franklin